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Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and 
the Things They Carry 
Margot E. Kaminski* 
ABSTRACT: 
Civilian drones are scheduled to be permitted in the 
national airspace as early as 2015.  Many think Congress 
should establish the necessary nationwide regulations to 
govern both law enforcement and civilian drone use.  That 
thinking, however, is wrong.  This Essay suggests drone 
federalism instead: a state-based approach to privacy 
regulation that governs drone use by civilians, drawing on 
states’ experience regulating other forms of civilian-on-
civilian surveillance.  This approach will allow necessary 
experimentation in how to best balance privacy concerns 
against First Amendment rights in the imminent era of 
drone-use democratization.  This Essay closes by providing 
some guidance to states as to the potential axes of drone-
related privacy regulations. 
INTRODUCTION 
Civilians will fly drones in the national airspace soon, if Congress has its 
way.1  Drones can carry a wide array of privacy-invading technologies, from 
Copyright © 2013 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their 
publications. 
* Executive Director of the Information Society Project, Research Scholar, and Lecturer in 
Law at Yale Law School.  Many thanks to Jack Balkin, Kevin Bankston, M. Ryan Calo, Catherine 
Crump, Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Christina Mulligan, and John Villasenor for their helpful comments. 
1. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 658, 112th Cong. (2012). 
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cameras to heat sensors to sensors that detect movement to odor detectors that 
can sniff the air.2  Drones are also cheap to own and operate, compared to 
manned aircraft.3 
States, fearing dragnet surveillance, have started examining gaps in 
privacy law.4  Their fears are well-founded; a Seattle woman recently reported 
a drone hovering over her yard and outside her third-story window.5  At the 
time of this Essay’s writing, over thirty states are actively considering drone-
related legislation, and the federal government has proposed several bills, one 
of which likely preempts most state regulation.6  This legislative surge 
demands a study of whether drone privacy law is better handled by the federal 
government, or by the states. 
The federal government has a history of regulating law enforcement 
surveillance through the federal wiretap statute, which could be updated to 
govern other law enforcement uses of drones.  An updated federal statute could 
therefore provide the floor for state regulation of law enforcement drone use, 
and the more limited subject matter of remote wiretapping by private parties.7  
However, governing civilian drone use on other matters, particularly video and 
2. See Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Support Border Security CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION 
TODAY (July/Aug. 2004), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2004/ 
Aug/other/aerial_vehicles.xml; see also H.B. 912, 83d Leg. (Tex. 2013) § 423.001 (“In this chapter, 
“image” means any capturing of sound waves, thermal, infrared, ultraviolet, visible light, or other 
electromagnetic waves, odor, or other conditions existing on or about real property or an individual 
located on that property.”). 
3. See, e.g., Chris Anderson, How I Accidentally Kickstarted the Domestic Drone Boom, 
WIRED (June 22, 2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/06/ff_drones/all/ (explaining that 
toy drones with the same capabilities as military drones sell “sometimes for less than $1,000” and 
hobbyist drones are “dirt-cheap”); see also Dan Ashley, Popularity of Drones Raises Privacy 
Concerns, ABC NEWS.COM (June 18, 2012), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/ 
assignment_7&id=8706281 (quoting drone enthusiast Mark Harrison as saying of hobbyist drones that 
“[e]ven a couple of years ago, this would be like a $10,000, $20,000 project and now [having] it be 
like $500, $600, as cheap as a smart phone, as cheap as a laptop computer, makes it pretty feasible”). 
4. M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29 (2011), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/drone-privacy-catalyst. 
5. Rebecca J. Rosen, So This is How it Begins: Guy Refuses to Stop Drone-Spying on Seattle 
Woman, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2013/05/so-this-is-how-it-begins-guy-refuses-to-stop-drone-spying-on-seattle-woman/275769/ 
(quoting the woman: “I initially mistook its noisy buzzing for a weed-whacker on this warm spring 
day.  After several minutes, I looked out my third-story window to see a drone hovering a few feet 
away”). 
6. Allie Bohm, Status of Domestic Drone Legislation in the States, ACLU (Feb. 15, 2013 
12:21 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/status-domestic-drone-legislation-states. 
7. Civilian-on-civilian wiretapping is governed by the federal Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (EPCA).  Because it contains a one-party consent requirement and exceptions where one 
party does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to the recording, ECPA’s application to private 
parties is unlikely to be a central concern of drone regulation.  However, it might be triggered by 
private use of cell site simulators, or “StingRays,” which intercept calls by tricking phones into 
thinking they are cellular towers.  Cell site simulators could be carried by drones.  See, e.g., Ellen 
Nakashima, Little-Known Surveillance Tool Raises Concerns by Judges, Privacy Activists, WASH. 
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image capture, will be far more complex, and will more closely resemble the 
regulation of subject matter traditionally covered by the states. 
Like all laws governing videos by private actors, drone surveillance laws 
will exist between a privacy floor and a First Amendment ceiling.  For now, I 
argue, this complex space of privacy regulation is best left to the states. 
I. 
DRONE PRIVACY REGULATIONS 
There are, broadly speaking, two subjects of drone privacy regulation: law 
enforcement drone use and civilian drone use.8  Most advocates and academics 
have focused on establishing privacy regulations to govern law enforcement 
drone use.9  This task is worthy of immediate attention.  The FAA already 
permits law enforcement drone use, where it does not yet permit commercial 
private drone use.10  A number of state and federal bills thus propose warrant 
requirements for drone surveillance by law enforcement.11 
The federal government could regulate law enforcement drone use as it 
has historically regulated other law enforcement behavior, by providing a floor 
for state laws.12  Federal legislation already governs law enforcement use of 
wiretaps and pen registers.13  Drone surveillance is likely to additionally 
involve video surveillance, location tracking, and/or facial recognition, among 
other possible technologies.  Thus federal legislation governing law 
enforcement surveillance could be expanded to govern location tracking, video 
surveillance, and the use of facial recognition software by law enforcement.14  
8. See John Villasenor, Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 
36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 457 (2013). 
9. See Paul McBride, Beyond Orwell: The Application of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in 
Domestic Surveillance Operations, 74 J. AIR. L. & COM. 627 (2009); Travis Dunlap, We’ve Got Our 
Eyes on You: When Surveillance by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
Search, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 173 (2009). 
10. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 § 334(c), H.R. 658, 112th Cong. (2012). 
11. See Preserving American Privacy Act of 2013, H.R. 637, 113th Cong. (2013) (requiring a 
warrant or court order for law enforcement drone surveillance, with exceptions for border usage, 
consent, and emergencies); Preserving Freedom from Unwanted Drone Surveillance Act of 2012, S. 
3287, 112th Cong. (2012)  (requiring a warrant, except for border patrolling, exigent circumstances, 
and high risk of terrorist attack); Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 6676, 
112th Cong. (2012) (requiring a warrant except in exigent circumstances, including imminent danger 
of death or a high risk of terrorist attack); see also Allie Bohm, Drone Legislation: What’s Being 
Proposed in the States?, ACLU (Mar. 6 2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-
liberty-national-security/drone-legislation-whats-being-proposed-states (listing states considering 
drone legislation requiring a probable cause warrant: Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Washington, and Wyoming). 
12. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522). 
13. Id. 
14. See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: 
Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012).  Recently, the House 
considered proposed amendments to ECPA to expand its coverage to include geolocation data retained 
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Regulating law enforcement drone use poses few countervailing dangers from 
legislating thoughtlessly or in haste; such legislation would implicate Fourth 
Amendment rights rather than First Amendment rights, so the worst case 
scenario is that such legislation might eventually be found by courts not to 
protect enough privacy.15 
The more interesting and difficult privacy puzzle arises from drone use by 
private—not public—actors.  Regulating civilian drone use will be treacherous, 
as such regulation potentially threatens First Amendment rights.  Because of 
that threat, civilian drone regulation may get overturned, as courts sort out the 
scope of those First Amendment rights.  Regulating civilian drone use on the 
federal level thus risks being unconstitutional or, barring that, unstable. 
Several states are considering banning civilian drone photography, or 
more broadly, civilian drone use.16  The proposed Texas Privacy Act, H.B. 912, 
bans drone photography without the consent of the property owner on whose 
property the image is taken, and at the time of this Essay’s writing, has passed 
the Texas House and is up for debate in the state Senate.17  Two proposed 
federal bills restrict the gathering of images and other information by 
civilians.18  One of these federal bills can be read to preempt state regulation of 
drone flights between states.19  This Essay argues that preemption of state 
drone regulation would be a mistake. 
 
by communications providers.  See Kevin Bankston, Today’s Other EPCA Reform News: Location 
Privacy Hearing in the House, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (Apr. 25, 2013), 
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/kevin-bankston/2504today%E2%80%99s-other-ecpa-reform-news-
location-privacy-hearing-house.  
15. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
16. H.B. 46, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013) (“No person, entity, or state agency 
shall use a manned aircraft, drone or other unmanned aircraft to conduct surveillance . . . of any 
individual, property owned by an individual, farm, or agricultural industry without the consent of that 
individual, property owner, farm or agricultural industry”); SB 150, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 
2013); H.B. 912, 83d Leg. (Tex. 2013). 
17. H.B. 912, 83d Leg. (Tex. 2013) Sec. 423.002 (“A person commits an offense if the person 
uses or authorizes the use of an unmanned vehicle or aircraft to capture an image without the express 
consent of the person who owns or lawfully occupies the real property captured in the image.”); see 
Jaikumar Vijayan, Texas Drone Bill Sparks a Battle, COMPUTERWORLD (May 17, 2013), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9239346/Texas_drone_bill_sparks_a_battle_. 
18. Preserving American Privacy Act of 2013, H.R. 637, 113th Cong. § 3119f (2013) 
(criminalizing the use of visual or audio enhancing devices on drones under certain circumstances); 
Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2012, H.R. 6676, 112th Cong. (2012) (proposing that 
civilians submit and be bound by data collection statements enforceable by the FTC). 
19. H.R. 637, 113th Cong. § 3119i (2013).  This bill explains that states are not preempted 
from regulating drone flights that occur within the state.  This language appears to preempt, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, regulation of all drone flights between states.  This would be broader 
preemption than what currently governs aviation law, where state torts have still been held to apply.  
See infra note 16. 
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II. 
FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS 
Laws governing civilian drone use risk restricting the ability of civilians 
to engage in legitimate and even essential information gathering.  These 
restrictions will be made in the name of privacy, but they are still restrictions 
on speech.  Courts have not yet determined whether privacy or speech triumphs 
in this conflict, or more subtly, how privacy and speech interests interact.  We 
are at the beginning of this conversation, not the end of it.20 
One recent example of behavior that raises these tensions between privacy 
and the First Amendment is cellphone recording of police activity.  States may 
want to afford citizens protection from being videotaped or audio-recorded 
without consent, reasoning that such technologically aided recording creates a 
permanent record that is qualitatively different from note-taking or memory.21  
In fact, there are good arguments that the First Amendment itself requires 
privacy measures; pervasive surveillance, whether created by private or public 
actors, has the potential to chill both association and speech.22 But in recent 
years, a number of courts have recognized First Amendment protection for 
videotaping and audio-recording in public.23  This protection is founded on a 
right to gather information, as part of speech or a precursor to it.24 
In a strange twist to this already-complex issue, the police in a number of 
states have used the wiretap laws that protect citizens from being videotaped 
without consent to arrest citizens who videotape police activity.25  Thus, a law 
that was intended to be privacy protective may in fact prevent oversight over  
 
20. See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. 
REV. 1149 (2005).  But see Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, Is Data Speech? 66 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2231821. 
21. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 3, 10 (2007). 
22. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright 
Management” In Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996).  This argument that privacy in fact often 
works in service of freedom of expression has also been made from a Fourth Amendment perspective.  
See, e.g., Priscilla J. Smith, Much Ado about Mosaics: How Original Principles Apply to Evolving 
Technology in United States v. Jones, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233561. 
23. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 
F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000). 
24. See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 
(2012) (“The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included within the First 
Amendment's guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the 
resulting recording. The right to publish or broadcast an audio or audiovisual recording would be 
insecure, or largely ineffective, if the antecedent act of making the recording is wholly unprotected.”);  
see also Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (“As the Supreme Court has observed, ‘the First Amendment goes 
beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from 
limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.’”). 
25. See Michael Potere, Who Will Watch the Watchmen? Citizens Recording Police Conduct, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 273 (2012); Travis S. Triano, Who Watches the Watchmen? Big Brother’s Use of 
Wiretap Statutes to Place Civilians in Timeout, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 389 (2012). 
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government functions, thereby empowering law enforcement rather than 
restricting it. 
Courts have split over how they handle these cases.  The First Circuit 
recently found that there is a clearly established First Amendment right to 
record the police.26  The Eleventh Circuit has noted that there is a First 
Amendment “right to record matters of public interest,” subject to reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions.27  The Seventh Circuit considered the 
Illinois eavesdropping statute, which makes it a felony to audio record a 
conversation unless all parties to the conversation consent, regardless of 
whether the communication was private.  The Seventh Circuit found that the 
statute “restricts far more speech than necessary to protect legitimate privacy 
interests; as applied to the facts alleged here, it likely violates the First 
Amendment’s free-speech and free-press guarantees.”28 
The Third Circuit, by contrast, found that there is no clearly established 
right to record police officers; the “right to record” is heavily contextual, so it is 
difficult to determine whether the right exists in a given fact pattern that courts 
have not yet considered.29  And notably, even those courts that found a First 
Amendment right to record have heavily weighed the context of such 
recordings.  Courts have looked to the fact that the subjects were government 
officials, in public places, or that the action as a whole was a matter of public 
interest.30  There are thus substantial unanswered questions about how broad or 
narrow the First Amendment right to record is, and how broad or narrow 
privacy measures must be to not impinge on it. 
One intuition that frequently arises in privacy cases, both under tort law 
and under the Fourth Amendment, is that the location of the recording matters.  
A First Amendment right to record is most likely to outweigh privacy concerns 
26. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding that “the First Amendment 
protects the filming of government officials in public spaces”). 
27. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that the “First 
Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, 
and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest”). 
28. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586-87 (7th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651, 184 
L. Ed. 2d 459 (U.S. 2012). 
29. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e conclude there was 
insufficient case law establishing a right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop to put a 
reasonably competent officer on ‘fair notice’ that seizing a camera or arresting an individual for 
videotaping police during the stop would violate the First Amendment. Although Smith and Robinson 
announce a broad right to videotape police, other cases suggest a narrower right. Gilles and Pomykacz 
imply that videotaping without an expressive purpose may not be protected, and in Whiteland Woods 
we denied a right to videotape a public meeting.”). 
30. See Glik, 655 F.3d at 83 (finding that “the First Amendment protects the filming of 
government officials in public spaces”); City of Cumming, 212 F.3d at 1333 (finding that the “First 
Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, 
and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Alvarez, 679 F. 3d at 600 (“[T]he 
eavesdropping statute restricts a medium of expression—the use of a common instrument of 
communication—and thus an integral step in the speech process. As applied here, it interferes with the 
gathering and dissemination of information about government officials performing their duties in 
public.”). 
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in a public space, where one person’s privacy collides with other peoples’ 
experience and memory.31  But creating a special delineation for privacy laws 
by restricting their application to non-public spaces runs into problems on both 
ends: public acts sometimes occur in private spaces; and private acts sometimes 
occur in public spaces. 
States might follow this location intuition, and ban drone use over private 
property.  The proposed Missouri drone privacy law, for example, bans video 
surveillance on any individual’s property without consent.32  So does the 
proposed Texas Privacy Act.33  Such laws follow popular intuitions about 
privacy, because they protect a visual trespass where physical trespass is not 
allowed.  However, they may run into preemption problems, and could also 
prevent information-gathering essential to political and social movements.34 In 
Dallas, for example, a hobbyist drone photographer uncovered pollution by a 
meat packing plant through aerial observation of activity on the plant’s 
property.35 
A number of states are currently considering bills sponsored by the cattle 
industry that criminalize video recording at farms.36  These bills target activists 
and journalists who have been recording conditions in industrial agriculture.  
Whatever one may think of the politics behind food production, it is clear that 
the video-making is part of an expressive chain of criticism that goes to the 
heart of the First Amendment.  The First Amendment does not prevent people 
from being arrested for trespass; but if they are legitimately on a property, it 
might prevent their arrest for recording video of matters of public interest.37 
U.S. law has long recognized the complicated tension between privacy 
and accountability.38  Banning drone photography or videography prioritizes 
31. See Seth Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, 
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (2011); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 
CALIF. L. REV. 383, 391-92 (1960) (arguing that public photography implicates no privacy right “since 
this amounts to nothing more than making a record, not differing essentially from a full written 
description, of a public sight which any one present would be free to see”). 
32. See supra note 16. 
33. H.B. 912, 83d Leg. (Tex. 2013). 
34. Thanks to John Villasenor for pointing out the possibility of federal preemption of a state 
ban on drones, and that nonetheless, individual property owners may have the ability to restrict drone 
flight in the airspace immediately above their property.  See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 
264 (1946) (“We have said that the airspace is a public highway. Yet it is obvious that if the landowner 
is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the 
enveloping atmosphere.”). 
35. Meghan Keneally, Drone Plane Spots a River of Blood Flowing from the Back of a Dallas 
Meat Packing Plant, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2091159/A-drone-splane-spots-river-blood-flowing-Dallas-meat-packing-plant.html. 
36. Editorial, Cattlemen Aiming to Kill Messenger, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 22, 2013), 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/editorials/article/Cattlemen-aiming-to-kill-messenger-
4377793.php#ixzz2R77DoYUJ. 
37. But see Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities, 194 F.3d 505, 519 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that a 
grocery chain could recover for trespass by reporters who used hidden video cameras while posing as 
employees). 
38. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the 
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the privacy rights of photographic subjects over the First Amendment rights of 
the photographer or videographer.  This may be the balance states and courts 
eventually choose, but as the developing circuit split over videotaping shows, it 
is not an easy balance to strike. 
The important question in privacy regulation of civilian drone use is thus 
whether this regulation should be enacted by the federal government, or by 
states.  The tension between privacy and First Amendment freedom is unlikely 
to be resolved in one fell swoop by a federal statute; moreover, federal 
preemption will preclude state experimentation.  Federal legislation is also 
costlier and more difficult to enact, and risks getting overturned by courts 
concerned about First Amendment implications.  Rather than attempt to get 
federal legislation right on the first try, and risk having it rejected by First-
Amendment-protective courts, we should allow states to run through less costly 
iterations. 
III. 
PRIVACY AND FEDERALISM 
Civilian drone use is not the first instance where privacy and federalism 
have crossed paths.  In 2006, a broad coalition of companies called for 
comprehensive federal consumer privacy law that would preempt state 
legislation.39  In response, two prominent privacy scholars, Paul M. Schwartz 
and Patricia C. Bellia, disagreed about the proper balance between federal and 
state governance of privacy. 
On the one hand, Schwartz argued that states can be “important 
laboratories for innovations in information privacy law.”40  States have been 
the first to identify significant regulatory areas in privacy law, and have 
provided innovative approaches to those areas.  For example, states were the 
first to regulate data security breaches, beginning with California’s Senate Bill 
1386 (S.B. 1386) in 2002.41  Through diversity, states have offered 
simultaneous experimentation with different policies.  In the data security area, 
states differ in the standards under which a company must share information 
about a data security breach.42 
On the other hand, argued Bellia, state privacy laws often follow federal 
legislation, pointing to the “importance of federal leadership in information  
 
Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 996-97, 1010 (1989) (“From the beginning, therefore, the 
task of the common law has been to balance the importance of maintaining individual information 
preserves against the public’s general interest in information. . . . The ultimate lesson of the tort, then, 
is the extreme fragility of privacy norms in modern life.”). 
39. See Riva Richmond, Business Group Calls for Privacy Law, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2006, 
at B2.  
40. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 916 (2009). 
41. Id. at 917. 
42. Id. at 918.  
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privacy problems.”43  State wiretap statutes, for example, share the federal 
statutory core while varying across only a few details. 
A federal, or mixed state and federal, approach to law enforcement drone 
use makes perfect sense.  A federal law governing law enforcement drone use 
would follow in the well-trod—albeit, outdated—footsteps of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).44  Like ECPA, federal legislation on 
law enforcement drone use could establish a statutory core to be shared by the 
states, or a statutory floor, permitting state deviation towards more protection.  
Additionally, because ECPA already establishes a familiar framework for 
warrants and court orders governing law enforcement surveillance, a federal 
law enforcement drone statute need not wait on extensive state 
experimentation.  The updates need not be drone-specific, and could cover 
location tracking, video surveillance, or use of biometric identification, or other 
new technologies, if these are the concerns raised by drone surveillance. 
As noted, legislation governing video or photographic surveillance by 
civilian drone users will be far trickier.  It will have to navigate the Scylla and 
Charybdis of privacy and the First Amendment.  And if enacted federally, it 
will deviate from how privacy regulation has historically been divided between 
the federal government and the states. 
There is no federal omnibus privacy law in the United States.  Federal 
privacy law consists of a series of sectoral regulations, enacted somewhat 
haphazardly.  One federal statute governs privacy in video watching, one 
governs drivers’ license information, one governs health information, one 
governs financial privacy, and so on.45  Drone-specific regulation would add to 
this patchwork. 
State privacy torts, by contrast, cover what most people think of when 
they think of personal privacy and social privacy norms.  The four classic 
privacy torts are the public disclosure of private facts, intrusion upon seclusion, 
false light, and appropriation.46  In short, privacy torts govern the way private 
information is obtained and used.  Sometimes, the emphasis is on whether the 
information is private; and sometimes, the emphasis is on how the information 
is obtained.  State privacy torts thus enforce social notions of personal privacy. 
Equally important for this discussion, state privacy laws have, unlike 
federal laws, been used to govern private video recording and audio recording 
similar to that contemplated by drone bills.  A number of states have all-party 
consent wiretap laws, including Maryland, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
43. Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE L. J. 868, 882 
(2009). 
44. See Stephanie Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now: Toward Reasonable 
Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 117 (2012). 
45. For a list of many of the federal privacy bills, see Existing Federal Privacy Laws, CENTER 
FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, https://www.cdt.org/privacy/guide/protect/laws.php (last 
visited May 13, 2013). 
46. See Prosser, supra note 31. 
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and Pennsylvania; citizens who audio record parties without consent may be 
subject to arrest or prosecution.  If video recording picks up audio, it is subject 
to these statutes. 
Thus states have been the historical locus of governance of personal 
privacy, and, as discussed, have also been the locus of recent tensions between 
privacy and the First Amendment.  This makes them the historical site of 
experimentation with privacy law that collides with the First Amendment. 
It is appropriate for state laws to continue to serve that function with 
respect to civilian drone use.  Each state will be able to express privacy values 
reflective of its own citizens’ differing principles and needs, and courts can 
determine whether these values collide with the First Amendment. 
Eventually, state civilian drone laws may converge into a floor that other 
states can each build on, with the more successful statutes—the ones that 
survive First Amendment scrutiny in courts— serving as the blueprint for 
eventual federal legislation.  For now, however, we truly do not have a uniform 
idea of how to balance privacy against speech rights in gathering information.  
If we federally legislate civilian drone surveillance, we risk creating a 
Congressional floor that collides with the First Amendment. 
IV. 
SOME QUALIFICATIONS 
This argument is conditioned on several important qualifications.  First, 
Congress must legislatively close the trap door that is the third-party or Miller 
doctrine.  The third-party doctrine allows law enforcement to avoid the warrant 
requirement by getting information from third parties that in turn observe the 
subject.47  If courts do not fix this loophole, Congress should require law 
enforcement to obtain a warrant before obtaining information gathered by 
private parties that it cannot otherwise obtain without a warrant.  Otherwise the 
flexibility explored by states in regulating private drone use will also turn out to 
be a way for law enforcement to obtain information gathered by private parties. 
Second, state experimentation with private drone surveillance should not 
preclude federal consideration of broader data privacy regulations, even 
regulations governing private actors.  The aggregation of stored information 
implicates a different set of both First Amendment and privacy concerns than 
the initial gathering of individual pieces of information.48  Thus arguing for 
state-by-state regulation of information-gathering that implicates First 
Amendment values does not preclude consideration of federal data privacy 
protection along the lines of the European Union’s Data Protection Directive, 
which governs the way personal data is processed, moved, and stored.49 
47. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
48. See Richards, supra note 20.  But see Bambauer, supra note 20. 
49. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) (on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data). 
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Third, this Essay does not intend to wrest safety or other basic aviation 
licensing matters from the Federal Aviation Administration.  And the Federal 
Aviation Administration should use its licensing programs to solve perhaps the 
biggest puzzle of drone regulation: how to provide notice or at least 
transparency to those being observed so they can determine whether they have 
been subjected to a privacy violation.  Unlike surveillance by camera phone or 
most forms of CCTV, drone surveillance will often provide no visible notice to 
the watched party if the drone is high up in the sky.50  As Representative Ed 
Markey proposed in a draft bill, the FAA could, as part of its licensing scheme, 
require that those using drones for surveillance submit a data collection 
statement indicating when, where, and for how long such surveillance will take 
place.51  The federal government should require such data collection statements 
to be easily searchable, and aid individuals in obtaining any footage or data 
gathered about them.  Both of these provisions are included in the proposed 
Markey bill.  Alternatively, or in addition to this scheme, the federal 
government could require drone radio frequency identification (“RFID”) 
“license plates” to track the location of drones at any given time.52  Tracking 
drones is essential to establishing whether a tort has occurred in any given state. 
Fourth, states should decriminalize the use of basic privacy-protective 
technologies.  It may surprise many to learn that a large number of states have 
anti-mask laws that criminalize mask-wearing in public, except under certain 
circumstances.53  Such laws prevent individuals from choosing to avoid 
surveillance in public places, inhibiting individuals’ expressive choices about 
whether to remain anonymous. 
In a world of increasing surveillance, giving more agency to the watched 
will justify maintaining protection of the expressive freedom of the watchers. 
V. 
WHY STATES ARE BETTER 
Assuming these conditions are met, Congress should defer to states on 
privacy regulations governing civilian drone use for video and audio 
surveillance.54  States have experience regulating many of the kinds of privacy 
50. At this time, many drones are very noisy and so provide aural notice.  But this feature will 
change as technology progresses. The proposed military ARGUS drone flies at 20,000 feet and can 
turn “30 or more square miles into live video sharp enough to spot individual people walking around.”  
See Devin Coldewey, ARGUS Drone Spots You From 20,000 Feet — With Camera-Phone Sensors, 
NBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/argus-drone-spots-you-20-000-feet-
camera-phone-sensors-1C8149730. 
51. Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 6676, 112th Cong. (2012). 
52. See Joseph Lorenzo Hall, ‘License Plates’ for Drones? CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND 
TECHNOLOGY (Mar. 8, 2013), https://www.cdt.org/blogs/joseph-lorenzo-hall/0803license-plates-
drones.  
53. See Margot E. Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies:  Applying Anti-Mask Case 
Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815 (forthcoming 
2013). 
54. But again, what we traditionally conceive of as wiretapping is already governed by federal 
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violations contemplated by those who fear drones, and state legislation permits 
experimentation with these regulations, subject to crucial feedback from courts 
on First-Amendment boundaries.  Congress should therefore wait to enact 
regulation of civilian use of drones for information-gathering until more data 
emerges out of state experimentation.  At the least, Congress should avoid 
preempting state regulation in any drone privacy statute it does enact. 
A number of state laws raise questions similar to those likely to be raised 
by drone regulation.  State wiretapping laws, Peeping Tom laws, video 
voyeurism laws, and paparazzi laws all currently regulate privacy-intrusive 
photography, videography, and sound recordings.55 
These laws vary in how they handle the scope of privacy protection 
against video and photographic intrusion.  State wiretap laws, for example, vary 
in whether they require the consent of one party, or the consent of all parties.  
They vary in whether there must be a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
conversation for a privacy violation to occur, and they vary in whether the act 
of recording must be surreptitious to be banned.56 
Peeping Tom statutes criminalize peeping through a hole or other aperture 
into a person’s home.  They are sparsely enacted, and relatively ineffective, 
because they require catching the Tom in the act.57  Video voyeurism statutes 
criminalize the viewing, videotaping, or photographing of another without 
knowledge or consent, when done for the purpose of sexual arousal.58  Some of 
these statutes require establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy, and 
some require that the criminalized image be of a nude or partially nude subject. 
Paparazzi statutes ban paparazzi from using special technologies to 
intrude on the personal life and personal spaces of celebrities.59  In handling 
these state statutes, many courts have shown a reluctance to find a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in public places.60  However, states could conceivably 
get around this reluctance if desired, through legislation. 
Presumably, states will also try to regulate the taking of photographs, 
video, or audio recordings from drones, as Texas H.B. 912 currently proposes.  
Drone anti-surveillance laws thus resemble these state privacy statutes that 
have led courts to grapple with the appropriate balance between privacy and 
free speech. 
law (ECPA), and new federal laws could set a floor for related electronic wiretapping concerns.  I 
argue merely that the application of these laws to video recording and audio recording by private 
parties implicate different concerns not raised by ECPA and traditionally dealt with by the states. 
55. State anti-stalking laws implicate the behavior of videographers and photographers, as 
well, and are on the books in all fifty states.  See Villasenor, supra note 8, at 505. 
56. See Triano, supra note 25, at 392. 
57. See Antonietta Vitale, Video Voyeurism and the Right to Privacy: The Time for Federal 
Legislation is Now, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 381, 390 (2003). 
58. See id.  
59. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (2011). 
60. See Nancy Danforth Zeronda, Street Shootings: Covert Photography and Public Privacy, 
63 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (2010). 
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The state wiretap law cases discussed above demonstrate that a wholesale 
ban on drone-based recordings would implicate a substantial First Amendment 
interest.  A wholesale ban of drone videography would thus likely not be found 
constitutional, because it would ban an entire medium of expression.61  But as 
current state laws demonstrate that a number of narrower privacy protections 
may be societally acceptable and even necessary, these types of restrictions 
may be imported into state anti-drone-surveillance legislation. 
In the next section, I explore the various ways in which states might 
legislate to protect privacy implicated by drone use. 
VI. 
AXES OF DRONE-RELATED PRIVACY LAWS 
State regulation of surveillance by civilian-operated drones could vary 
along a number of axes.  I do not mean to suggest a uniform law, or to 
guarantee that all of these variations would survive First Amendment 
challenges.  But this section attempts to provide states with possible variations 
for regulation of civilian drone surveillance, based on the axes of existing state 
privacy laws. 
States should avoid banning an entire class of recording technologies.  
Instead, they might apply reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.  For 
example, a state might decide that certain physical locations should not be 
subject to drone surveillance, or that such surveillance should be permitted only 
during certain times.  However, as discussed above, states might wish to 
include exceptions for matters of public interest or actions by public figures, 
and consider newsworthiness as a defense.62 
States could alternatively, or in addition, choose to target socially 
unacceptable behavior on the part of the recorder/drone user, by banning 
surreptitious use or requiring that drone users obtain consent from recorded 
parties.  But as we have seen with the application of state wiretap laws to 
cellphone taping of police, focusing on consent alone can result in significant 
restrictions on First-Amendment-protected activities if all parties being 
recorded refuse to consent for reasons that have nothing to do with privacy 
61. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586-87 (7th Cir. 2012) (observing that the overly broad 
wiretap statute was unconstitutional because it banned all audio recording, subject to consent of the 
subjects, and did not consider whether the act of recording was surreptitious, or whether the subjects 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation);  see also Kreimer, supra note 31, at 374 
(observing that “captured images . . . fall within the protection of ‘freedom of speech’”); Robert Post, 
Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 717 (2000) 
(observing that banning unlicensed use of film projectors would trigger First Amendment scrutiny not 
because projectors are speech, but because they are “integral to the forms of interaction that comprise 
the genre of cinema”). 
62. For example, Illinois considered updating its eavesdropping law to allow citizens to record 
audio of police who are on duty and in public.  See, e.g., Alissa Groeninger, Illinois’ Outdated 
Eavesdropping Law Still in Limbo, CHI. TRIB. (June 24, 2012), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-24/news/ct-met-illinois-eavesdropping-law-
20120624_1_eavesdropping-law-noland-law-enforcement; see also Triano, supra note 25, at 422. 
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restrictions.  Instead, just as some state wiretap laws target surreptitious or 
secret recording, state drone privacy laws could ban surreptitious recording by 
drones.63  Under this scheme, if a person is openly recording you, even if they 
have not obtained your explicit consent, then there would be no privacy 
violation. 
State drone laws could consider the superhuman nature of the technology 
being used.64  Some states have banned the use in certain situations of 
technology that is so enhanced that one has no idea one is being recorded in 
traditionally private spaces; the California paparazzi statute, for example, 
penalizes the use and attempted use of a visual or auditory enhancing device 
that captures “personal or familial activity” that could not otherwise have been 
accessed without a physical trespass.65  One proposed federal drone bill models 
its language after this statute.66 
States could protect acts from being recorded when the acts themselves 
are subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.  As mentioned above, a 
number of courts have recently found that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in public spaces.67  Several courts however, have found that there can 
be a reasonable expectation of privacy in public; the Alabama Supreme Court 
found that a photograph of a woman’s underwear, even though taken in public, 
was still an invasion of privacy.68  The California Supreme Court has also 
recognized that a car crash victim could have an expectation of privacy in her 
conversations with a nurse and other rescuers, even though the crash took place 
in public.69 
States could guide courts by legislatively dictating a reasonable 
expectation of privacy even in public spaces.  The federal Video Voyeurism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (“VVPA”) demonstrates one such effort.  The VVPA 
statutorily defines a reasonable expectation of privacy as including a reasonable 
63. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 99(B)(4) (West 2012) (“The term 
‘interception’ means to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record 
the contents of any wire or oral communication . . . .”). 
64. See, e.g., Priscilla J. Smith, Nabiha Syed, David Thaw & Albert Wong, When Machines 
Are Watching: How Warrantless Use of GPS Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth 
Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 177 (2011), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/10/11/smith.html. 
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (West 2011). 
66. See Preserving American Privacy Act of 2013, H.R. 637, 113th Cong. § 3119f (2013) (“It 
shall be unlawful to intentionally operate a private unmanned aircraft system to capture, in a manner 
that is highly offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other 
physical impression of a [sic] individual engaging in a personal or familial activity under 
circumstances in which the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use of a 
visual or auditory enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, 
sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless 
the visual or auditory enhancing device was used.”) 
67. See, e.g., Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832, at *3-4 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006) (finding that an Orthodox Hasidic Jewish man photographed in public by a 
prominent photographer, unbeknownst to him, did not experience an invasion of privacy). 
68. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). 
69. Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc.. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). 
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person’s belief that a private area (genitalia) would not be visible to the public, 
“regardless of whether that person is in a public or private place.”70  Although 
the Fourth Amendment does not yet recognize privacy expectations in a public 
place (although five Justices in United States v. Jones indicated that such an 
expectation exists when surveillance is pervasive), state legislatures may be 
able to foster a competing recognition through statutes by defining 
circumstances in which people can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
public.71 
A series of courts of appeals cases on video surveillance in the mid-1980s 
through the early 1990s may prove informative.  These cases found Fourth 
Amendment protection from video surveillance of non-public places,72  and 
created heightened procedural hurdles for law enforcement use of video 
surveillance, because such surveillance was hidden, intrusive, indiscriminate, 
and continuous.  State privacy laws address whether surveillance is hidden by 
asking if recordings were surreptitious, and to some extent assume the 
intrusiveness of certain technologies (audio recording, photography, 
videography) compared to others (sketching a picture, for example, or retelling 
an overheard conversation from memory).  But these laws generally fail to ask 
whether surveillance was indiscriminate—that is, whether it captured more than 
the potentially newsworthy fact in its scope—and whether the surveillance was 
continuous.  State drone surveillance laws could consider additionally 
addressing these two axes by penalizing indiscriminate and/or continuous 
recording, or including those features in a definitional determination that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated. 
Thus state drone laws could vary according to whether they regulate the 
time and place of recordings; whether they require consent to record; whether 
they require surreptitious behavior on the part of the recorder/drone; whether 
they ban the use of enhancing technologies when recorders peer into 
traditionally private spaces; whether they require a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the recorded act; and whether that reasonable expectation of privacy 
could be defined to exist within a public space or be implicated by 
indiscriminate and/or continuous recording. 
VII. 
DRONE EXCEPTIONALISM 
 Drones may be the impetus for regulation, but they should not be its end.  
States should consider enacting general anti-video-surveillance legislation that 
70. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. §1801(b)(5)(B) (2006). 
71. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(agreeing that “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy); see also id. (Alito, J., concurring) (characterizing the question presented as 
whether the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy was violated by long-term monitoring of his 
movements).  
72. Freiwald, supra note 21, at 10. 
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is not drone-specific.  Drones do differ from existing surveillance technology in 
important ways, not because of one particular feature but because of an 
accretion of distinguishing features.  But many of these features apply equally 
to camera phone use, or the use of remote biometric identification by private 
companies. 
Because of their relatively low cost and hovering abilities, drones give rise 
to a specter of pervasive surveillance, much like existing technology that can be 
used for surveillance, like camera phones.73  However, unlike surveillance by 
camera phone or most forms of CCTV, drone surveillance might provide no 
visible notice to the watched party.74  Unlike online surveillance, where, given 
notice, users at least can decide which sites to visit and which services to 
employ, drone surveillance gives no agency to the watched party. 
Additionally, drone use might not be subject to contextual social privacy 
norms in the way that, for example, email use is.  If you send an email to a 
friend, you can usually trust that the friend will not forward it (although you 
cannot trust that your email server won’t read it).  But you have made no such 
normatively founded calculation with respect to the use of drones by your 
neighbors, or neighborhood businesses, or national businesses.  With drone 
surveillance, you have not chosen to send information to a friend you trust; that 
information is recorded without your assessment that the recorder is a 
trustworthy party bound to certain privacy norms by her social relationship 
with you. 
Fundamentally drones threaten privacy because of the tools they carry.  
Drones can engage in a number of kinds of remote surveillance.  And many of 
those tools are addressed, or should be addressed, by sectoral privacy laws.  For 
example, using a drone to intercept conversations by deploying a cell-site 
simulator should be governed by a law prohibiting wiretapping.  Using a drone 
to track an individual’s location should be governed by a law prohibiting 
location tracking.  And using a drone to video somebody should be governed 
by a law on video surveillance or image capture.  Thus, rather than employing a 
drone-specific solution, state legislators should consider more general updates 
to laws governing the kinds of surveillance they fear. 
The difference between a drone and a camera phone may end up 
mattering, but this need not result in drone-specific protections.  If a drone is in 
fact more privacy violative than a camera phone, courts could place more 
weight on privacy violations when considering drone surveillance cases than 
camera phone cases.  This does not, however, mean they should be governed by 
different statutes. 
 
73. See supra note 3. 
74. Currently, low-cost drones certainly provide audio notice, as they are very noisy.  But as 
this changes, and if private drones are permitted to fly at the level of commercial aircraft, drones may 
provide no notice at all. See supra note 50. 
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VIII. 
PREEMPTION 
All discussions of federalism must eventually address the possibility of 
federal preemption.  While this Essay is by no means an exhaustive exploration 
of this topic, it is worth at least cursorily addressing whether preemption 
already exists.  State privacy regulation of drones does not appear to be 
currently preempted by federal law, insofar as it does not interfere with how or 
where flight occurs.75  One of the proposed federal drone bills, however, does 
attempt to preempt at least some state regulation.76 
The location of the drone—that is, whether it flies particularly close to the 
ground—does not determine who regulates them.  Historically, the FAA has 
regulated (although minimally) low-flying hobbyist aircraft, and now 
contemplates putting in place more stringent regulations to govern such aircraft 
when they are used for commercial purposes.  Since 1981, the FAA has 
permitted hobbyists to fly remote-controlled aircraft without FAA licensing, as 
long as the flight is under 400 feet and within their line of sight.77  The FAA 
recently clarified, however, that when such aircraft are used for business 
purposes, they may require “compliance with applicable FAA regulations and 
guidance developed for this category.”  The FAA also plans to host rulemaking 
specifically directed at drones under 55 pounds.78  Thus there will be overlap of 
FAA regulatory authority with state regulation even of small, low-flying 
drones. 
However, FAA regulation of small, low-flying drones does not preclude 
all state regulation.  Congress has not created express statutory preemption of 
laws governing aerial surveillance, and has even expressly nodded to 
exceptions to federal preemption in the field of aviation.  The original Federal 
Aviation Act had a savings clause explaining that “[n]othing contained in this 
Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law 
or by statute.”79  In 1994, Congress amended this clause to explain that a 
75. See Villasenor, supra note 8, at 513-514 (noting that while aircraft safety, noise, and 
operation are governed by the FAA, “the safest legislative role for states with respect to [unmanned 
aircraft systems] UAS privacy lies in minimizing privacy abuses by non-government UAS operators”). 
76. Preserving American Privacy Act of 2013, H.R. 637, 113th Cong. § 3119i (2013) 
(“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to preempt any State law regarding the use of unmanned 
aircraft systems exclusively within the borders of that State.”).  This language can be read several 
ways, but arguably implies preemption of state regulation of drones that fly between states. 
77. See FAA, ADVISORY CIRCULAR (AC) 91-57, MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS 
(1981); see also FAA, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 5 
(2007), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/reg/media/ 
frnotice_uas.pdf. 
78. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 § 331(6), H.R. 658, 112th Cong. (2012), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr658enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr658enr.pdf (“The 
term ‘small unmanned aircraft’ means an unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds”); see id.  
§ 332(b)(1) (requiring “a final rule on small unmanned aircraft systems that will allow for civil 
operation of such systems in the national airspace system, to the extent the systems do not meet the 
requirements for expedited operational authorization under section 333 of this Act”). 
79. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c)). 
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“remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law.”80  
Presumably, the 1994 revision still intends to exempt state tort laws, for 
example, from federal preemption. 
A number of courts have found federal preemption of state attempts to 
impose curfews on airports or enjoin flight patterns over certain areas.81  But 
federal aviation law does not preempt state common law tort claims for injuries 
suffered during crashes.82  Additionally, federal aviation law does not preempt 
a city’s zoning power on land, because that power does not conflict with air 
use.83  However, aviation safety law impliedly preempts state schemes for 
regulating alcoholic beverages on board an aircraft.84 
One interesting question will be whether the use of cameras on a drone is 
considered to fall under the regulatory power of the government in federal 
airspace, or under the state power to protect its citizens from privacy injuries on 
land.85  While to my knowledge there is no extensive system of privacy 
regulation on airplanes, courts might find that airplane safety regulations 
impliedly preempt state regulation of cameras on planes, as they did the 
regulation of alcoholic beverages. 
CONCLUSION 
In its haste to address the specter of a civilian drone invasion, Congress 
should not preempt states from enacting privacy laws governing civilian drone 
use.  States have served as laboratories for experimentation in achieving a 
balance between First Amendment rights and privacy protection.  Congress 
should permit them to continue doing just that, until an appropriate balance is 
struck and federal regulation of civilian drone use might again be considered. 
 
80. 49 U.S.C. §40120(c) (2006). 
81. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973); see also 
Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975); San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. 
Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981). 
82. Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft, 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Congress has intended to 
allow state common law to stand side by side with the system of federal regulations it has 
developed.”). 
83. Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul, 912 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1990). 
84. U.S. Airways v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 2010). 
85. Another interesting question, raised by John Kincaid in comments on this Essay, is 
whether local governments in crowded cities might have additional authority to regulate drones at low 
altitude, owing to city-specific conditions such as wall-to-wall skyscrapers.  Local regulation of drone 
altitude and traffic would have implications for drones’ abilities to gather information. 
 
